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are trying to explain. Explanation should be the most important
objective of the scholarly enterprise, not simple description of
a phenomenon. Eclectic approaches, if not used carefully, can
end up in thick descriptions of a mish-mash variety, a danger
that scholars should try to avoid. Also, sometimes a single
paradigm can explain a given phenomenon better and if so,
one should be willing to accept that possibility without brand-
ing himself as a card-carrying member of a paradigm. Sil and
Katzenstein offer us a coherent set of philosophical founda-
tions and a flexible analytic framework for research that does
not fit into existing paradigms. Now, it is up to other scholars
to do more of the problem-focused empirical work needed to
make this a core approach in the discipline.
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Following the pragmatist bent of our conceptualization of
analytic eclecticism, we view the four excellent commentaries
offered above as a welcome opportunity to engage in open-
minded dialogue and to clarify certain defining attributes of
eclectic scholarship. Two commentaries are offered by An-
drew Bennett and Peter Haas, who are sympathetic critics of
our work: They accept our premise that research confined to
paradigms has built-in limits, but then offer some frank assess-
ments of the challenges and limitations of analytic eclecticism.
They raise important issues about the implications of analytic
eclecticism for the cumulation and assessment of theories, and
for some of the risks that existing institutional practices pose
to eclectic scholarship. We regard their remarks less as a cri-
tique of our arguments and more as impressive forays into the
sorts of discussions that we hope will displace stale inter-
paradigm debates if academic scholarship is to become more
connected to the world of policy and practice (Calhoun 2009;
Nye 2009; Shapiro 2005). The other two commentaries, by Alice
Ba and T.V. Paul, come from “insiders” in the sense that both
are authors of works we discuss in our book (2010b) as exem-
plars of eclectic scholarship. Admittedly, they have little in-
centive to critique a book that casts their work in a favorable
light. Their thoughtful and candid reflections, however, go a
long way toward helping us clarify some important points about
the different pathways to analytic eclecticism and the com-
plexities involved in coding what counts as eclectic scholar-
ship.
Let us begin by making clear what these scholars are com-
menting on: Bennett and Haas are addressing an article pub-
lished in Perspectives on Politics (2010a) as well as our book,
Beyond Paradigms (2010b); Ba and Paul are primarily reacting
to the latter. The article is a general programmatic statement,
outlining the intellectual rationale and philosophical founda-
tions for eclectic work in both comparative politics and inter-
national relations. It develops a consistent set of markers for
distinguishing between scholarship embedded in research tra-
ditions and analytically eclectic research. In addition, it under-
scores eclecticism’s reliance on an expansive and open-ended
definition of causal mechanisms, at least for analyzing prob-
lems that feature “more extensive endogeneity and the ubiq-
uity of complex interaction effects” (Hall 2003). The book of-
fers the same general argument, but focuses solely on interna-
tional relations and employs the term “paradigm,” which is
more commonly used to characterize contending schools of
thought in that field. The book is not an anthology but offers
instead a sustained, coherent argument. We did not ask for
permission to label as “analytically eclectic” any of the fifteen
works discussed—five in each of three substantive chapters
discussing eclectic research in the analysis of security, politi-
cal economy and global governance. Nor did we extract any
passages or selections from any of these studies. Instead, we
deployed our own criteria for deciding which studies consti-
tute reasonable approximations of analytic eclecticism in inter-
national relations (2010b: 19–23): open-ended problem formu-
lation, a complex causal story featuring mechanisms from mul-
tiple paradigms, and pragmatic engagement with issues of
policy and practice. We then discuss the content of several
exemplary studies in a manner that highlights their eclectic
character, their distinctiveness vis-à-vis paradigm-bound re-
search on the relevant topic, and their value-added within the
context of scholarly efforts to understand particular aspects of
international life. Finally, we incorporate brief 400-word state-
ments (presented in fifteen boxes in the book) from each of the
scholars, each responding to specific questions we posed
about their experiences in producing eclectic scholarship.
Bennett’s essay is running a bit ahead of us. It pushes us
after the publication of our book to confront more fully issues
that we see as arising if there were to follow a wider acceptance
of the assumptions and practices associated with analytic eclec-
ticism. Because of the prevalence of a paradigm-centered view
of international relations scholarship, we were primarily fo-
cused on clarifying the trade-offs between work embedded in
paradigms or research traditions on the one hand and eclectic
research on the other. We also sought to highlight the advan-
tages of eclectic scholarship for addressing specific problems
in world politics. Since, to date, there does not yet exist a
critical mass of eclectic research on any given problem, we
touched only briefly on the questions Bennett wishes us to
now pursue. We welcome the implied optimism about the po-
tential impact of our formulation of analytic eclecticism on schol-
arly practices. And we see his articulate commentary as an
invitation to reflect further upon the implications of adopting
an eclectic approach for the character, utility, and evolution of
social scientific knowledge.
First, it is worth noting that our ambitions are more limited
than Bennett’s. We are gratified that Bennett notes our track-
ing of current trends in the philosophy of science. It is, how-
ever, worth emphasizing that we proceed from foundations
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.936293
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that are more closely associated with neopragmatism rather
than with versions of philosophical realism or neopositivism.
Certain strands of realism and pragmatism do have much in
common, but pragmatism is more explicit about several points
we consider crucial for defending analytic eclecticism: it calls
for greater scope for deliberation among a more inclusive com-
munity of inquirers; it discounts the separation between ab-
stract knowledge and practical insights relevant to a specific
situation; and it views all knowledge as a set of tentative in-
sights that can never be confirmed as “the truth” but can be
updated and recombined in different ways in concrete situa-
tions (Sil and Katzenstein 2010b: 43–48). Furthermore, analytic
eclecticism does not aspire to general theories that cover dif-
ferent types of problems. Rather it is restricted to the level of
“middle range” theory as identified by Robert Merton’s under-
standing of the term. This means that theoretical constructs—
concepts and propositions—are designed to gain traction on
a set of similar problems clearly demarcated and easily identi-
fied in concrete situations that recur in world politics. An eclectic
approach that is grounded in pragmatism and is limited in aspi-
ration to middle-range theorizing does not aim at ambitious,
holistic understandings of “theory cumulation” across entire
disciplines or subfields. And it does not facilitate a direct as-
sessment and comparison of theories that deal with different
problems even if these are loosely categorized under similar
labels such as “security” or “political economy.”
At the same time, as Bennett recognizes, the combinato-
rial forms of knowledge we associate with analytic eclecticism
can be organized in such a way that they allow us to identify
discrete configurations of causal mechanisms that are por-
table across those contexts within which a given problem is
identified. Within these limited contexts theory cumulation is
possible insofar as there is a progressively deeper understand-
ing of how general mechanisms interact in different environ-
ments to generate different or recurrent processes. It is also
possible to develop and compare different kinds of analyti-
cally eclectic arguments, each proposing distinctive configu-
rations of mechanisms in relation to similar kinds of problems.
We have not done this in the book, as we considered instead
an array of problems on which eclectic scholarship has pro-
vided fresh insights in comparison with arguments developed
within paradigms or research traditions. However, once a criti-
cal mass of eclectic scholarship has emerged in relation to any
given problem, the next step would indeed be to compare eclec-
tic middle-range theories in terms of how plausible the inter-
connections between general mechanisms are, and how con-
sistently the combined effects of a particular configuration of
mechanisms are evident in a given context or environment. An
adequate response to what Bennett is asking for would require
a companion volume once it becomes easier to locate multiple
eclectic approaches to a given problem. For the time being, we
are fully cognizant of both the limits and possibilities for theory-
cumulation and theory-comparison at the level of mid-range
theorizing. We view both as valuable endeavors, but only within
a more concretely delimited intellectual terrain, bounded not
by disciplines or fields of study but by the attributes of similar
concrete problems with similar scope conditions.
Bennett also asks us to consider whether we can assess
the long-term value of eclectic scholarship through the lens of
a Lakatosian conception of scientific progress (Bennett 2003;
Elman and Elman 2003). Such a conception would be based on
the identification of “novel facts”—the value of which is
established through “use novelty” and “background theory
novelty”—and is not incompatible with eclectic modes of schol-
arly inquiry. Bennett is absolutely right in noting that there is
no need to establish paradigms or designate “hard cores” and
“outer belts” in order for scholars to arrive at a consensus that
specified evidence would have use novelty or background
theory novelty relative to specific theories or explanations.
However, one aspect of our argument is critical to bear in mind
here: Scholars do have a great deal of leeway in how they
frame their core problems. Problems can be posed in such a
manner that they not only encourage the use of certain meth-
ods (Sil 2004), but also draw greater attention to particular
mechanisms in particular domains or levels of social reality.
Extending Ian Shapiro’s (2005: 184) observation about the for-
mulation of research questions in the discipline, we argue:
The issue, in our view, is not whether the social sciences
ought to be problem-driven or method-driven but rather
how problems are identified and formulated. Projects em-
bedded in different research traditions frequently address
similar or related substantive issues but parse these
issues in order to focus on specific aspects in keeping
with their theoretical priors. Such simplification of social
reality is certainly understandable, even necessary. How-
ever, the extent to which and the manner in which large
parts of that reality are simplified in the formulation of
problems matter for the purpose of generating insights
that bear on the choices and actions of actors coping with
complex substantive problems. A pragmatist conception
of analytic eclecticism invites us to consider how the prob-
lems as defined within research traditions might (or might
not) relate to each other and to concrete dilemmas related
to policy and practice. (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a: 418–19)
This suggests that the designation of “novel facts” is not
a straightforward process when paradigm-bound scholarship
is juxtaposed with eclectic arguments about similar problems.
For example, “use novelty” would require drawing upon new
observations that can serve as additional evidence to support
a claim initially based on some other evidence. However, eclec-
tic scholarship often generates claims that are significantly
more complex for the simple reason that the scope of the prob-
lem is expanded so as to partially reverse the simplifications
made by paradigm-bound researchers in posing their ques-
tions. Similarly, background theory novelty is a useful stan-
dard when a proposition purports to explain anomalies or un-
explained phenomena; but what constitutes an anomaly or an
unexplained phenomenon is often shaped by the substantive
focus and scope conditions inherent in a research question as
posed by individual scholars. Since eclectic scholarship is of-
ten aimed at problems that incorporate or subsume the more
narrowly framed questions taken on by adherents of para-
digms, the designation of what constitutes a “novel fact” be-
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comes more problematic than would be the case with theories
that take on similar questions formulated within a paradigm.
We do not wish to intimate that Bennett’s suggestion is
not useful or that theory incommensurability is an intractable
problem. In fact, we go to some lengths to establish that the
problem of incommensurability is often over-emphasized and
that it can be mitigated by translating concepts and analytic
principles upon consideration of the empirical referents used
to operationalize these (Sil and Katzenstein 2010a: 414–15;
2010b: 13–16). This effectively suggests that applying the
Lakatosian standard of novel facts involves a two-step pro-
cess. The first involves the difficult task of translation and
comparison of related problems that have been cast at differ-
ent levels of abstraction, are formulated in different theoretical
vocabularies, and have different scope conditions. Only after
this first step has been taken can we be assured that we are
discussing a set of theories (whether paradigm-bound or ana-
lytically eclectic) that are actually addressing the same prob-
lem. And only then can we have a meaningful discussion of
whether a given eclectic approach has “use novelty” or “back-
ground condition novelty.” But before we can tackle intricate
problems in the philosophy of the social sciences, the most
immediate need is a critical mass of eclectic scholarship that is
organized around the complex, messy problems of real-world
politics rather than around intellectual puzzles designed to
test or apply the concepts and analytic principles associated
with existing paradigms.
Like Bennett, Haas also wants to push us forward, to en-
gage questions that we would consider to be significant only
if and when analytic eclecticism becomes more widely prac-
ticed in the discipline. In the section focused on the philoso-
phy of science, Haas appreciates the utility of eclectic per-
spectives that train their sights on the interplay of diverse
mechanisms. But he insists (rightly) on asking what comes
next. In particular, he wonders if we are holding back too much,
perhaps constrained by a general commitment to Larry Laudan’s
(1977, 1996) philosophy of science. Haas is right to note some
of the limitations of Laudan’s work. Since our interest in Laudan
is mediated by a more fundamental commitment to pragmatist
philosophy, we are not wedded to every aspect of Laudan’s
philosophy of science. Our reading of pragmatism (2010a: 416–
418; 2010b: 43–48) provides the bridge that Haas is looking
for—connecting our commitment to a rigorous social science
with our conviction that there is much to be gained from an
“assemblage of mid-level findings” organized around concrete
problems that have both scholarly and practical import.
We take from Laudan the concept of a research tradition.
It offers a more realistic framing of the shifting controversies in
the field than the more rigid conceptions of scientific progress
offered by Kuhn or Lakatos. Operationalizing a research tradi-
tion rigorously is difficult, as Haas points out. But this is even
more true of paradigms and research programmes which, as we
note in the book, are concepts that do not map on to the messy
intellectual history of social science disciplines and subfields.
In social scientific research, boundaries are unavoidably fuzzy
and encompass more diversity in ontologies and epistemic
principles than is commonly recognized. This is why we opt to
understand controversies in the social sciences through the
lens of Laudan’s “research traditions,” which eschews a styl-
ized rendering of scientific progress and allows for scholars
working in multiple traditions. In the book, we use the term
“paradigm” for the sake of simplicity, but we define it as inter-
changeable with “research tradition.”
We also borrow from Laudan the notion that the useful-
ness of a theory depends more on its ability to solve problems
than on its contribution to the cumulation of knowledge. In-
deed, a pragmatist perspective sees the very idea of knowl-
edge cumulation as more of an abstract ideal than an ongoing
process to which all research inevitably contributes. There is
no presumption that eclectic scholarship will gradually pave
the way toward all-encompassing “grand truths” that will be-
come firm guides to action and policymaking. Nor would we
characterize the results of eclectic, problem-centered mid-level
analysis as “small insights” relative to the “broader insights”
supposedly generated by more ambitious theoretical claims.
In fact, it is precisely grandiose ambitions for unified theories
and knowledge cumulation that, in combination with the avail-
ability of material and organizational resources, have given
rise to the inter-paradigm debates that remain prevalent today.
Moreover, the most self-conscious and self-confident ad-
herents of a paradigm treat knowledge cumulation in an even
more restrictive manner. They see cumulation as predicated on
acceptance of the metatheoretical assumptions and theoreti-
cal principles associated with their preferred paradigm. Yet, the
only people who might concur with such a view are those
working in the same paradigmatic tradition! Thus, what consti-
tutes “progress” or “cumulation” for some does not consti-
tute progress or cumulation for the field as a whole. Given this
predicament, the “small insights” of eclectic scholarship are
actually quite “big” in terms of their potential impact, both on
the relevant scholarly fields and on policy-relevant debates
and discussions. Mid-range eclectic analyses may be modest
compared with general laws or grand theories, but we see this
modesty as purposeful for the valiant attempts at mediating
between different paradigms and connecting academic theo-
ries to public discourse and policy debates. For these reasons
we do not regard eclectic mid-range theorizing as a way station
to a grand theory around which a discipline or subfield will
eventually reorganize. Rather, eclectic work, alongside para-
digm-bound research, continually accommodates and encour-
ages efforts that aim at translation, comparison, and dialogue
within and beyond academic circles.
Haas’ remarks about the sociology of knowledge present
a more immediate and direct challenge to analytic eclecticism,
or at least to scholars considering eclectic approaches. Haas is
of course correct that the structures of the discipline militate
against the eclectic scholarship we advocate; that was the
reason why we wrote the book in the first place. Beyond that,
Haas raises the important issue of collaborative work. Haas
notes that we rely on single-author works to make the case for
eclectic scholarship that is useful, compelling, and rigorous.
This overlooks the fact that one of the studies we discuss is
actually coauthored (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) and that
our book is itself an exercise in collaboration. We thus see no
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inherent value in single-author eclectic work. Intellectual and
practical reasons may push two or more eclectically oriented
scholars to collaborate, as we ourselves have. Faced with the
intellectual requirements and professional risks associated with
eclectic work, having a coauthor or contributing to an anthol-
ogy may have intellectual, psychological, and professional
advantages.
In the contexts of hiring, grant competitions, and promo-
tion, collaborative work of all stripes faces special hurdles in
many (but not all) fields and in many (but not all) major re-
search universities. Whatever their intellectual orientation,
younger scholars in particular must demonstrate their ability
to work independently in designing and executing research
projects. Although scholarly research does not need be tied to
single individuals, in real life, jobs, tenure reviews, and promo-
tions focus largely on the track record of individuals. This is
true in general and does not constitute a specific barrier against
the recognition of eclectically oriented work. Whether the so-
cial sciences stand to benefit by encouraging and rewarding
collaborative research is an important question, but it is one
that needs to be addressed on its own terms.
On the difficulties of publishing eclectic scholarship in
academic journals, we do not have any fixed prescriptions.
New journals, as Haas points out, may be helpful in opening
up space for eclectic research that existing journals may shy
away from. But the low visibility of new journals means that
articles published in them generally are overlooked and are not
given the credit they may deserve when the time comes to
assess an individual’s scholarly productivity and professional
standing. The editorial boards and reviewers of well-estab-
lished journals do learn of course from intellectual currents in
the field, but we know little about such learning processes in
different parts of the discipline. In the end, if some journals
and their editorial boards are clearly partial to specific ap-
proaches or methodologies, scholars will have to accept that
fact and move on with their lives. At the same time, good social
science journals do have to compete with each other for read-
ers and so can ill afford to ignore shifting currents in the field.
This means that they have an incentive to occasionally stretch
their boundaries to accommodate articles that do not fit their
“normal” profile. In these instances, eclectic scholarship may
well prove to be a stronger candidate for publication in a jour-
nal that favors one paradigm, at least compared with scholar-
ship embedded in a rival paradigm.1
Finally, it is important to underline the encouraging fact
that we were able to identify eclectic analyses that have been
published by first-tier journals and top university presses.
Many scholars, both senior and junior, are moving away from
paradigm-bound research in their own work even as they con-
tinue to view the field of international relations as still domi-
nated by contending paradigms. As we observe in the book
(2010b: 25), in the 2008 TRIP survey (Jordan et al. 2009: 9, 33),
36 percent of the American respondents (and about the same
percentage of the sum total of all respondents from nine other
countries combined) indicated that their own work did not fall
within one of the major international relations paradigms. This
figure constitutes a significant minority; and the percentage is
noticeably larger than in previous iterations of the same sur-
vey (e.g., Maliniak et al., 2007). Leaving aside the studies we
discuss in our book, in several fields scholars are increasingly
gravitating towards more eclectic styles of work, although not
always self-consciously so. For example, Haas discusses how
empirical research in the field of international environmental
law has moved away from debates between the “transforma-
tional school” and the “enforcement school,” and has con-
verged around a provisional consensus on the importance of
complex processes that incorporate both inducement mecha-
nisms and learning mechanisms.
The commentaries from Alice Ba and T.V. Paul offer us an
opportunity to clarify several important points about the pro-
duction and identification of analytic eclecticism. First, ana-
lytic eclecticism has no set recipe and is not an end in itself.
There are many different ways through which different schol-
ars ended up generating work that we code as eclectic. In Ba’s
case there was no explicit commitment to an eclectic mode of
inquiry. Instead her emphasis on process pushed her increas-
ingly to look at complex configurations of factors that did not
neatly fall within the boundaries of a single paradigm. In Paul’s
case the movement towards eclecticism cut across several re-
search projects. It began with a limited effort to add nuance to
core realist arguments by adding elements from neoliberalism
in his earlier book (Paul 2000). In subsequent work Paul (2009)
made a more explicit effort to merge ideational aspects nor-
mally associated with constructivism with materialist factors
emphasized in neorealism and neoliberalism. These observa-
tions, as well as the reflections of the other thirteen authors
whose work we engage in the book, provided an unexpected
bonus in helping us see more clearly and state more forcefully
that analytic eclecticism “is not meant to constitute a discrete
new ‘ism’ to replace or subsume all other ‘isms’ in the field of
international relations. It is, however, a useful heuristic for
capturing the common requirements of metatheoretical flexibil-
ity and theoretical multilingualism necessary for substantive
analyses that are not embedded in any one paradigm” (2010b:
25). Ultimately, what makes an eclectic research strategy worth
pursuing is the desire to better understand complex, socially
important real-world problems that existing paradigm-bound
theories either fail to address or address only in part.
In different ways, Ba and Paul also point to the difficul-
ties of promoting an eclectic approach in a field accustomed
to viewing scholarship through the lens of inter-paradigm
battles. For both, the most unexpected response to their books
was not unanticipated criticisms of substantive claims but
rather efforts to label the studies using familiar categories.
Paul refers to the “pigeonholing” of his work, while Ba refers
to her fears that the complex processes she lays out would
not satisfy a discipline wedded to the idea of contending
paradigms. Old (paradigm-focused) habits die hard. We are
not surprised by this reaction. It was a major reason why we
wrote our book. We hope that analytic eclecticism and the
pluralist spirit it embraces will become a more established part
of our disciplinary lexicon, so that authors can focus on the
merits of their own work without being concerned about be-
ing pigeonholed or about having to manage the expectations
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of scholars adhering to competing research traditions.
This is a good place to note a particularly vexing problem
we encountered when identifying eclectic scholarship: Some
authors characterized their books as refined versions of
constructivism. This is true of Ba (2009) as well as Martha
Finnemore (2003) and Nicolas Jabko (2006). Jabko, for example,
characterizes the approach in his book as “strategic construct-
ivism.” This pattern is also evident in more general metatheo-
retical perspectives on international affairs such as the “prag-
matic constructivism” articulated by Peter Haas and Ernst Haas
(2009). We address this problem directly in our book (2010b:
41–43), emphasizing the need to distinguish between program-
matic commitments to constructivism as a distinct paradigm
and “weak” identification with constructivism for tactical rea-
sons. The latter, we view as an artifact of the timing and intel-
lectual environment within which constructivism emerged: it
was the third of the three major IR paradigms to arrive on the
scene, at a time when some neorealists and neoliberals were
gravitating towards a rationalist “neo-neo synthesis” (Waever
1996: 163; see also Keohane 1989: 165). Thus, for those wish-
ing to incorporate ideational factors in their analyses, a rea-
sonable path to take has been to distinguish themselves from
purely rationalist analyses and to identify themselves with
constructivism even if ideational constructs are not actually
privileged in ontological or theoretical terms. For such schol-
ars, we hope, analytic eclecticism may present a more appeal-
ing alternative to having to squeeze uncomfortably into one of
the existing paradigms.
The real issue is the quality and value-added of the indi-
vidual eclectic approaches. Ba and Paul both underline an-
other caveat that we repeatedly make in both our article (2010a)
and book (2010b). Analytic eclecticism does not offer a carte
blanche to produce either idiosyncratic stories for each and
every case or a never-ending laundry list of factors that poten-
tially influence each and every outcome. Ba is wary of “ad-
hocery” that might trade away standards of good research in
exchange for an “everything goes” approach. Paul similarly
warns that eclectic analysis should be wary of falling into the
trap of providing “thick descriptions of a mish-mash variety.”
Instead analytic eclecticism gives researchers a license to cut
across or operate in between the boundaries separating re-
search traditions. The research contributed by adherents of
paradigms identifies important causal mechanisms and makes
significant contributions that deserve our serious attention. A
commitment to analytic eclecticism does not provide a warrant
for ignoring these contributions but rather, as Bennett sug-
gests above, invites us to figure out how different types of
mechanisms normally explored in isolation from one another
might interact as part of more complex configurations in a given
context. As Ba notes in her contribution, our conceptualization
of analytic eclecticism is a call “not just for a pragmatic en-
gagement of our empirical problems at hand, but also a prag-
matic engagement of existing paradigms as a way to produce
more focused, as opposed to scattered, analysis.”
We conclude by addressing Bennett’s qualms about our
choice of the term “analytic eclecticism” in lieu of an alterna-
tive that would carry fewer negative connotations. We are sur-
prised that for Bennett the term has negative connotations;
the initial spontaneous and unprompted responses to our book
and article, from both close colleagues and scholars we do not
know, suggest otherwise. In any case, there were many rea-
sons why we chose this term. Some are accidental. Sil had
always been struck by the use of the term “eclectic” in a well-
known symposium on theory in comparative politics (World
Politics 1995) in which Katzenstein, Peter Evans, Atul Kohli,
James Scott and others highlighted the limits of simplifications
in the name of parsimony and acknowledged the “eclectic messy
center” at the heart of comparative politics. At the time, how-
ever, there had been no serious effort to define “eclectic” schol-
arship or to explicate the rationale for it. In subsequent work,
both Sil and Katzenstein independently developed distinct
but complementary understandings of what eclecticism en-
tailed and what it could contribute to, respectively, compara-
tive politics and Asian regional security (Sil 2000, Katzenstein
and Okawara 2001/02). When we decided to join forces at a
conference in 2003, it made sense to stick to a term that both of
us were already comfortable with and that we both were begin-
ning to get identified with in different circles.
Over time we became more self-conscious in embracing
the term “eclecticism.” Gunther Hellmann (2003: 149) has
pointed out that the field of international relations has a par-
ticularly strong penchant for “stigmatizing as eclectic what-
ever approach to current problems in international politics does
not fit along the established axes of scholarly enlightenment.”
This view is also echoed in the statement from Timothy Sinclair
that Alice Ba cites in the epithet for her contribution to this
symposium: eclecticism has been presumed to be “the ultimate
taboo,” especially in graduate training. We think that this phase
in the evolution of international relations scholarship is pass-
ing and that the time has come to turn a fresh page. In our work
we thus emphasize the value-added, in both intellectual and
practical terms, of eclectic styles of inquiry. It is not our inten-
tion to dismiss the scholarship that has emerged from para-
digms or traditions. We are, however, convinced that any field
that continues for too long to define, pursue, and evaluate
research solely through the lens of paradigmatic assumptions
and inter-paradigm contests risks missing out on crucial in-
sights about the complex processes and intersecting mecha-
nisms that account for interesting outcomes in world politics.
Analytic eclecticism offers a promising way forward.
Note
1 For example, while it is true, as Haas notes, that The Journal of
Theoretical Politics was created to publish work on rational choice
and game theory, this is the same journal that published Sil’s (2000)
article on “The Foundations of Eclecticism.”
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Our intuitive understandings of causality include a gen-
erative process in which a cause yields an effect by triggering
the operation of certain mechanisms. When individuals are
presented with data suggesting an association between two
variables, they routinely want additional information related to
mechanisms before declaring the association to be causal in
nature (Ahn et al. 1995). Social scientists are no different: they
believe that causal effects are transmitted through linking pro-
cesses of one kind or another.
The large social science and philosophy of science litera-
ture that has developed around the idea of a “causal mecha-
nism” encompasses a heterogeneous set of arguments and
definitions (see the suggested readings for this essay). For
our purposes, we do not need to delve into the complexities of
this literature. Instead, for the purposes of this essay, we un-
derstand causal mechanism to mean the intervening processes
through which causes exert their effects. We propose that any
relatively well-developed theory or model will provide a dis-
cussion of causal mechanisms. This is equally true for theories
tested in the quantitative and qualitative research traditions:
They propose ideas about the causal mechanisms that link
independent variables to dependent variables.
The key issue we explore in this essay is how the qualita-
tive and quantitative traditions empirically assess theories
about mechanisms when making causal inferences. In the quali-
tative culture, researchers carry out this assessment by at-
tempting to observe mechanisms through process tracing and
the analysis of causal process observations (Collier, Brady,
